Article III

Judge Koh of the District Court for the Northern District of California recently granted LinkedIn’s motion to dismiss with leave to amend in Low v. LinkedIn.  Covington represents LinkedIn in this case, in which Plaintiff alleges that he suffered injury by virtue of LinkedIn’s purported transmittal of a unique UserID to certain third parties as a portion of a URL referrer header.

The Court held that the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient injury-in-fact to satisfy Article III standing, because “Plaintiff has failed to put forth a coherent theory of how his personal information was disclosed or transferred to third parties, and how it has harmed him.”  In making this determination, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s theories of  “emotional” and “economic” harm.

With respect to emotional harm, the court noted that Plaintiff was “unable to articulate a theory of what information had actually been transmitted to third parties, how it had been transferred to third parties, and how LinkedIn had actually caused him harm.”  Similarly, in considering Plaintiff’s theory of economic harm, the Court held that Plaintiff’s allegations were “too abstract and hypothetical to support Article III standing,” citing a growing body of precedent, including Judge Koh’s own recent decision in In re iPhone Application Litigation, in which courts have held that the unauthorized collection of personal information does not create an economic loss.  Quoting Specific Media, the Court observed that Plaintiff had failed to allege how he was foreclosed from capitalizing on the value of his personal data or how he was “deprived of the economic value of [his] personal information simply because [his] unspecified personal information was purportedly collected by a third party.”Continue Reading LinkedIn Motion to Dismiss Granted

Yesterday, Judge Lucy Koh of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted defendants’ motions to dismiss the consolidated, amended complaint in In re iPhone Application Litigation for lack of Article III standing, with leave to amend.  In finding lack of standing, the Court stated that plaintiffs’ allegations were “clearly insufficient” as plaintiffs did not allege “injury in fact to themselves” and “did not identify a concrete harm from the alleged collection and tracking of their personal information sufficient to create injury in fact.”  Further, the Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to allege any injury fairly traceable to Apple or any of the Mobile Industry Defendants.

In addition, the Court articulated specific deficiencies with respect to each of the causes of action, in the event plaintiffs choose to file an amended complaint.  These shortcomings include the fact that plaintiffs did not allege economic damages sufficient to meet the required threshold to state a civil claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.  The Court also found, as an increasing body of authority has held, that a plaintiff’s “personal information” does not constitute money or property under California’s Unfair Competition Law.Continue Reading In re iPhone Application Litigation Dismissed

By Eric Bosset

Judge Phyllis Hamilton of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California recently permitted a lawsuit arising out of a major data security breach suffered by social-media application developer RockYou to survive a motion to dismiss in part, based on the theory that plaintiff had  stated a “generalized injury” sufficient to maintain Article III standing—at least at the initial pleading stage—because the breach of plaintiff’s personally identifiable information (“PII”) allegedly caused loss of an “ascertainable but unidentified ‘value’ and/or property right inherent in [plaintiff’s] PII.”  Although this decision trends away from a recent dismissal [PDF] of a privacy suit by the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on standing grounds, based on failure by that plaintiff to allege that the defendant caused any “actual or imminent harm,” it is a narrow ruling, the primary impact of which was to shift on these facts the timing of application of the operative standing test from the pleadings stage to the summary judgment stage.

Recognizing that the plaintiff was advancing a novel theory of damages for which supporting case law is scarce and that there is no clearly established law regarding the sufficiency of allegations of injury in the context of the disclosure of online personal information, the RockYou Court declined to hold as a matter of law that plaintiff had failed to allege an injury in fact sufficient to support Article III standing.  (Under Lujan, Article  III  standing requires “injury in fact” that is “concrete and particularized”).  Notably, though, the Court also stated that it would dismiss plaintiff’s claims for lack of standing should it become apparent, after discovery, “that no basis exists upon which plaintiff could legally demonstrate tangible harm via the unauthorized disclosure of PII” (emphasis added).  The Court also rejected as a matter of law the characterization of PII disclosure as “lost money or property” and noted its doubts about plaintiff’s ultimate ability to prove the damages alleged in the complaint.  Additionally, the Court dismissed with prejudice several of the causes of action asserted, based on plaintiff’s failure to allege the more particularized elements of injury required for these claims—including a claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.), which requires a plaintiff to prove that a violation caused loss of money or property.Continue Reading For Now, RockYou Court Finds Standing Based on PII Disclosure

Last week, the Ninth Circuit issued two opinions in connection with the theft of an unencrypted laptop that contained personal information about Starbucks employees.  First, the court held in a published opinion that Starbucks employees whose names, addresses and Social Security numbers were on the stolen computer could show that

Continue Reading Starbucks Employees Affected By Data Breach Have Standing To Sue In Federal Court