On June 29, 2026, in a 6-3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that (1) the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) statutory “for‑cause” removal protection for Commissioners violates the Constitution’s separation of powers and (2) President Trump lawfully removed Rebecca Slaughter from the FTC. The Court concluded that because FTC Commissioners exercise executive power, they must be removable by the President at will rather than only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”

In reaching that result, the Court rejected the longstanding framework established by Humphrey’s Executor v. United States. The majority held that to the extent Humphrey’s allowed Congress to insulate FTC Commissioners from at‑will removal, it is no longer good law.

The decision significantly limits Congress’s ability to structure independent agencies outside direct presidential control, calling into question the core premise underlying agency independence.

Background

The FTC Act provides that Commissioners serve fixed terms and may be removed only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,” a structure historically understood to promote agency independence. President Trump, shortly after beginning his second term, removed two FTC Commissioners, Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya, without invoking the statutory for‑cause removal standard.

Commissioner Slaughter sued, arguing her removal was ultra vires. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted her motion for summary judgment and issued a permanent injunction restoring her to office, reasoning that Humphrey’s controlled. A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the Government’s motion for a stay pending appeal.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari before the appellate court’s judgment and ultimately reversed, directly addressing the continuing validity of Humphrey’s and the constitutionality of removal protections for members of independent agencies.

The Court’s Reasoning

The majority grounded its decision in the Constitution’s text, structure, and historical practice, emphasizing the central role of the President in controlling the executive branch.

First, the Court reasoned that Article II vests “[t]he executive Power” in the President and requires the President to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” From this, the Court derived a principle of hierarchical accountability: executive officers act as subordinates of the President and must remain subject to his supervision. According to the majority, that supervision necessarily includes the power of removal. Without such authority, the President would be unable to ensure faithful execution of the laws or to remain accountable to the public for executive action.

Second, the Court relied heavily on historical evidence and precedent, particularly the “Decision of 1789” and Myers v. United States, to support the proposition that removal authority is inherent in the executive power. The Court emphasized that early practice and longstanding precedent confirm that executive officers must be removable at will in order to preserve the unity, accountability, and “general administrative control” of the executive branch.

Third, the majority rejected the analytical framework of Humphrey’s. The Court explained that Humphrey’s rested on a distinction between executive, “quasi‑legislative,” and “quasi‑judicial” functions that is no longer tenable.

In this context, the Court determined that the FTC’s powers place it squarely within the executive branch. The FTC promulgates rules with the force of law, investigates regulated entities, conducts in-house adjudications, and brings civil enforcement actions in federal court. These activities, the Court emphasized, constitute “the very essence” of executing the law. Because FTC Commissioners perform executive functions, they must be fully subject to presidential control, including removal at will.

Implications

The decision has significant implications for both the FTC and the broader administrative state.

For the FTC, the ruling fundamentally alters the agency’s structure by eliminating the statutory protections that historically promoted independence from political control. Commissioners are now subject to removal at will by the President. As a result, future administrations are likely to exercise greater influence over the FTC’s leadership and enforcement priorities.

The President’s firing of Commissioners Slaughter and Bedoya has already had a massive impact on the Commission’s current composition. At present, only two Commissioners remain, both affiliated with the Republican Party, and the pending nominee is also Republican. The absence of a bipartisan composition highlights how the elimination of removal protections may enable greater presidential control over the Commission’s structure and direction.

More broadly, the decision calls into question the constitutionality of removal protections across a wide range of independent agencies, though the Court expressly limited its decision as to non-Article III judges, such as judges of the Tax Court and the Court of Federal Claims.

For businesses, the decision signals a shift toward greater political influence in federal regulation. Agencies that were previously designed to operate with a degree of independence may become more closely aligned with presidential policy priorities. This may lead to more rapid changes in enforcement approaches and regulatory interpretation following changes in administration.

We will continue to monitor developments arising from this decision. If you have questions about how Trump v. Slaughter may affect your business or pending regulatory matters, please contact the members of our Advertising and Consumer Protection Investigations practice.