A federal court recently addressed whether plaintiffs alleging misleading commercial email practices in violation of Washington’s Commercial Electronic Mail Act (“CEMA”) have Article III standing to pursue claims. The ruling suggests that alleged violations of CEMA, standing alone, could constitute a concrete injury for Article III standing, where the asserted harm aligns with the statute’s purpose.

CEMA prohibits sending commercial emails to Washington residents that contain “false or misleading information” in the subject line. Recently, plaintiffs have filed a wave of class actions alleging that retailers violated CEMA by using promotional subject lines that create a false sense of urgency, such as suggesting that a discount or promotion is expiring when it later continues. Defendants in these cases have asserted defenses on motions to dismiss, including based on federal preemption under the CAN-SPAM Act and the dormant commerce clause, although unsuccessfully.

Standing is a key issue emerging in CEMA litigation. In Liss et al., v. Skechers USA Inc., the court ordered the defendant to show cause why the case should not be remanded to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In response, Skechers argued that plaintiffs had alleged a concrete injury sufficient to establish standing. Although a statutory cause of action is not sufficient to establish a concrete injury-in-fact, the defendant argued that “the Supreme Court also has recognized that some statutory violations, alone, do establish concrete harm.” See Liss et al. v. Skechers USA, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-05861, ECF No. 36 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 16, 2026) (citing to Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2017)). Specifically, Skechers argued that the receipt of alleged spam imposes harm on all users by wasting consumers’ time and filling their email inboxes, which CEMA was designed to address.

The court agreed and held that plaintiffs adequately alleged Article III standing based on the claimed CEMA violations, even in the absence of more traditional economic harm. The court relied on the principle articulated in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016), that courts must “assess whether the alleged injury to the plaintiff has a close relationship to a harm traditionally required as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.” See Sketchers USA, Inc., ECF No. 42 (W.D. Wash. May 19, 2026). Applying that framework, the court concluded that the alleged receipt of misleading commercial emails constituted the type of harm the Washington legislature sought to prevent in enacting CEMA, and therefore was sufficient to establish injury-in-fact. Notably, the court reached this conclusion even though the plaintiffs did not allege that they purchased any products as a result of the emails or otherwise suffered tangible economic loss. Under that theory of standing, plaintiffs may not need to allege reliance on the misleading emails, purchases, or other tangible losses to establish injury-in-fact, which could increase the litigation risk for companies engaged in email marketing.