Critical Infrastructure

On 19 March 2026, Advocate-General Capeta issued an opinion in the case of Elisa Eesti AS v Estonian Government Security Committee (C-354/24). This case concerned, among other things, whether a 2022 order from the Estonian Government for Elisa Eesti AS—a 5G network operator—to remove Huawei components from its network for national security reasons was subject to EU law, constituted a lawful restriction on the right to offer an electronic communications network, and amounted to a “deprivation of property” requiring compensation. AG Capeta concluded that the relevant Estonian regime was within scope of EU law—specifically the European Electronic Communications Code (“EECC”)—even though that regime allowed for the imposition of orders on electronic communications network (“ECN”) providers for national security reasons. She also concluded that the requirement to obtain prior authorization from the Estonian government for use of network equipment constituted a restriction on the freedom to provide an ECN, but that this could be justified on national security grounds if the decision was based on a genuine risk assessment that meets the requirements for proportionality under EU law. She stated that this determination should be left to the referring court. Finally, she concluded that the Estonian Government’s order did not amount to a “deprivation” of property for which compensation would be required, as it was instead a mere “restriction” on the use of property. Below, we describe these non-binding conclusions in more detail. The Court’s final ruling in this case will have significant implications for the European Commission’s proposed revisions to the EU Cybersecurity Act, which as drafted would—among other things—allow the Commission to require ECN providers to remove and cease using components from designated high-risk jurisdictions in their networks. See our prior blog post on the proposal for a revised Cybersecurity Act here. Continue Reading CJEU Advocate-General indicates that communications network operators can lawfully be required to remove Chinese components, and that compensation is not required

Earlier this month, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”) announced a series of public town hall meetings to solicit additional stakeholder input on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“Proposed Rule”) implementing the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (“CIRCIA”), which CISA published in April 2024.

Continue Reading CISA Announces Town Halls to Gather Input on CIRCIA Proposed Rule

On 20 January 2026, the European Commission published a proposal for a Regulation to update and replace the Cybersecurity Act (Regulation 2019/881). The proposal—known as the Cybersecurity Act 2 (CSA2)—forms part of a wider package aimed at modernizing and streamlining the EU’s cybersecurity framework and is closely linked to the

Continue Reading European Commission Proposes Cybersecurity Act 2: New EU Supply Chain Rules and Certification Reforms

On December 11, 2025, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”) released its Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (“CPG 2.0”), an update to its core set of recommended cybersecurity practices for critical infrastructure owners and operators, which we previously wrote about here.  Established by the 2021 National Security Memorandum

Continue Reading CISA Releases Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 for Critical Infrastructure

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”) plans to delay the publication of its much-anticipated cybersecurity incident reporting rule implementing the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (“CIRCIA”).  According to an entry on the Spring 2025 Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, released on September

Continue Reading CISA Delays Cyber Incident Reporting Rule for Critical Infrastructure

Last month, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”), in partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), National Security Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, and cybersecurity authorities in Australia, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, and New Zealand, published new cybersecurity guidance (the “Guidance”) related to operational technology (“OT”), i.e., systems and devices that interact with a physical environment that are commonly used in manufacturing, utilities, oil and gas production, transportation, and other industrial operations.  The Guidance, which will be of interest to any organizations that have an OT environment, is intended to help critical infrastructure entities develop and implement an OT asset inventory and taxonomy to protect their critical assets and improve incident response preparedness.  It comes in advance of upcoming cyber incident reporting requirements for critical infrastructure in the U.S. under the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (“CIRCIA”) and in the EU under the revised Network and Information Systems Directive (“NIS2 Directive”).  The Guidance is the latest in a series of joint releases from CISA, FBI and other U.S. and international partners on various security-related topics largely intended for critical infrastructure, including AI data security, product security bad practices, quantum computing cyber threats, and secure software development.

Continue Reading CISA Publishes OT Asset Inventory Guidance for Critical Infrastructure

On July 23, the White House released its AI Action Plan, outlining the key priorities of the Trump Administration’s AI policy agenda.  In parallel, President Trump signed three AI executive orders directing the Executive Branch to implement the AI Action Plan’s policies on “Preventing Woke AI in

Continue Reading Trump Administration Issues AI Action Plan and Series of AI Executive Orders

The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) recently issued Order No. 907 (the “Order”), approving a new Critical Infrastructure Protection (“CIP”) Reliability Standard, CIP-015-1.  The new standard will require covered entities that maintain certain bulk electric systems (“BES”) to implement Internal Network Security Monitoring (“INSM”) for network traffic within their “electronic security perimeter,” i.e., the logical border surrounding the network of interconnected devices that comprise a BES Cyber System.  However, as discussed below, these requirements will not go into effect for approximately three years, and many covered entities will have an additional two years before they are required to comply.

Continue Reading FERC Finalizes New Internal Network Security Monitoring Requirements for Bulk Electric Systems

On June 30, 2025, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3), and the National Security Agency (NSA) warned U.S. critical infrastructure organizations and other companies that the threat of cyber attacks from Iran-affiliated cyber actors is heightened

Continue Reading U.S. Government Issues Cybersecurity Warning to Critical Infrastructure Operators and Others

As many readers will be aware, the EU’s new cybersecurity directive, NIS2, imposes security, incident notification, and governance obligations on entities in a range of critical sectors, including energy, transport, finance, health, and digital infrastructure (for an overview of NIS2, see our previous post here). One of the main reasons the Commission proposed these new rules was the inconsistent ways in which Member States had implemented requirements under the prior directive, NIS. To help improve harmonization further, the Commission has now issued two guidance documents to help assess when NIS2 or sector-specific requirements apply, and to ensure that registration requirements are consistent across the Union.
Continue Reading European Commission Publishes Guidance on NIS2: Interplay with Sector-Specific Laws